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CABLE TELEVISION'S NEW LEGAL UNIVERSE: 
EARLY JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE 
CABLE ACT 
MICHAEL I. MEYERSON· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 29, 1984, a new era began in the relationship 
between law and cable television. On that day the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Cable Act") was signed into 
law.
' 
The Cable Act is the first comprehensive federal cable legis-
lation. Prior to its passage, the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC") regulated cable pursuant to its "ancillary" 
power over broadcasting2 through the Communications Act of 
1934,3 which was enacted long before the technology of cable 
was invented,4 and hardly drafted with cable in mind. 
Regulatory problems were created by the fact that different 
levels of government were involved in the regulation of cable. 
Not only did the FCC have an interest in protecting broadcast 
television,5 state and local governments had an interest in over-
seeing the cable operator's use of public streets and rights-of-
way. "A city needs control over the number of times its citizens 
must bear the inconvenience of having its streets dug up and the 
best times for it to occur. Thus, government and cable operators 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. B.A. Hampshire College, 
1976; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1979. 
1 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III 1985)). Since the legislative history and 
many courts use the numbering of sections from the original law as passed, this Article 
will also use that numbering in the text. Footnotes will provide both section numbers 
where appropriate. 
2 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). But see 
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S, 691 (1984) (upholding FCC regulation 
whose purpose was to ensure that" 'the benefits of cable communications become a 
reality on a nationwide basis.''' [d. at 708, quoting Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regu-
lation-CATV, Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 855, para. 33 at 865 (1975)). 
3 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
4 In 1948, one of the earliest, if not the first, cable television systems wa,s con-
structed in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, by an appliance store owner who built it to 
create demand for television sets at his store. S. WEINSTEIN, GETTING THE PICTURE 
(1986). 
5 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 303. The FCC has stated that cable uses "broadcast sig-
nals as the backbone of the service they provide." CATV, First Report and Order, 20 
F.C.C.2d 201, para. 46 at 222 (1969). 
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are tied in a way that government and newspapers are not."6 
The resulting division of regulatory power was described op-
timisticallyas "a deliberately structured dualism."7 Local gov-
ernments had primary control over the awarding and terms of 
franchises,8 but the FCC supervised areas such as signal carriage9 
and franchise fees. 10 
By 1984, Congress had concluded that the regulatory mix 
was unworkable. As described by the lead Senate sponsor of the 
Cable Act: 
Comprehensive legislation is needed to replace the patchwork 
of Federal, State, and . local regulations and court decisions 
that have been governing cable. The Communications Act, 
written over 50 years ago before cable even existed, provides 
little or no guidance. The result has been an unstable regula-
tory environment that has been bad for the cable industry, bad 
for the local and State franchising authorities, and bad for 
consumers. II 
The Cable Act radically altered the regulatory "patchwork." 
Virtually every area of cable regulation is covered by the thirty-eight 
sections of the Cable Act. 12 For the first time, federal legislation has 
6 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th 
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). 
7 Cable Television, Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, para. 177 at 207 (1972). 
8 "Most decisions related to the award of a cable franchise have historically been 
made at the municipal level." H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Congo 2d Sess. 23 reprinted ill 
1984 U.S. CODE, CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4655 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
9 See Capital Cities Cable, 11Ic., 467 U.S. at 716 (upholding FCC preemption of state 
regulation of the "signals carried by cable operators."); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. V. FCC, 
768 F.2d 1434, 1437 (1985) (striking down FCC "must-carry" requirement that cable 
operators carry "[e]very over-the-air television broadcast signal that is 'significantly 
viewed in the community' "), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Community Cable TV, 
Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1204 (1984) (FCC ruling barring 
franchising authorities from stopping cable operators from removing or realigning pro-
gramming offered on regulated tiers). 
10 FCC Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984) (deleted and removed 
1985) (limiting franchise fees to three percent of a cable system's gross revenue per 
year, subject to an increase to five percent if "appropriate in light of the planned local 
regulatory program." Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648 (1985) [hereinafter Implementation], aJf'd 
in part. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
II 130 CONGo REC. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
The first cable system was constructed in 1948. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, CABLE 
TELEVISION AND OTHER NON BROADCAST VIDEO 1-2 (1986). Thus, the Communications 
Act of 1934 actually preceded thl advent of cable television by only 14 years. 
12 Cable Act §§ 601-639,47 U.S.C. § 521-559 (Supp. III 1985). The Act did not 
resolve issues regarding the regulation of "non-cable communication services," such as 
data transmission. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 60 (The Committee on Energy and 
Commerce "intends that state and Federal authority over non-cable communications 
services under the status quo shall be unaffected by the provisions of[the Cable Act]."); 
see also In re Generic Investigation into Cable Television Service in New Mexico, 103 
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defined the scope of regulatory power at all levels of government. 
The local franchising process was termed "the primary means of 
cable television regulation,"13 subject now to explicit statutory 
limitation. 
As with any major new law, litigation has begun to determine 
the scope and meaning of the statute. This Article will explore the 
first judicial attempts to interpret the Cable Act. A common thread 
running through these varied cases, if any, is the courts' apparent 
lack of appreciation of the Act's complexity. Many, though not all, 
decisions appear to misread congressional language and misinter-
pret congressional intent. Future litigation will inevitably explore 
these issues more fully and perhaps with a fuller understanding of 
the regulatory framework Congress attempted to create. 
The first part of this Article will discuss issues common to all 
sections of the Cable Act: the purposes of the Act, retroactivity and 
grandfathering, and the constitutionality of cable regulation. 14 The 
second part will discuss judicial interpretation of specific sections of 
the Act: rate regulation, modification, tenants' access to cable tele-
vision and cable piracy. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CABLE ACT 
A. Purposes of the Cable Act 
In interpreting any federal statute, it is critical to determine 
the intent of Congress in enacting the legislation. "If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains 
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, 
that intention is the law and must be given effect."15 Even if 
Congress did not expressly address a particular "precise" issue 
before a court, questions of the coverage of a statute may still be 
resolved by an evaluation of "the policy concerns that motivated 
the enactment."16 . 
When Congress enacted the Cable Act, it attempted to ex-
plicitly enumerate the "policy concerns" behind the statute. 
Ironically, the concerns were so numerous and so complex that 
N.M. 345, 707 P.2d 1155 (1985) (state regulation of data transmission services offered 
by a cable operator are not preempted). 
13 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19. 
14 The issue of standing to sue under the Cable Act is addressed in a separate article 
in this Survey. See Manishin, Anlilnlsl and Regulalion in Cable Television: Federal Policy al il'ar 
wilh Iiself, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 75 (1987). 
15 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 n.9 (1984). 
Iii [d. at 862-63. 
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the statement of congressional intent has frequently confused the 
courts, rather than elucidated them. 
The first section of the Cable Act,17 details six purposes for 
the legislation: 
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable com-
munications; 
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which en-
courage the growth· and development of cable systems and 
which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs 
and interests of the local community; 
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and 
local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems; 
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are en-
couraged to provide the widest possible diversity of informa-
tion sources and services to the public; 
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which 
protects cable operators against unfair denials of renewal 
where the operator's past performance and proposal for fu-
ture performance meet the standards established by this sub-
chapter; and 
(6) promote competition in cable communications and mini-
mize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue eco-
nomic burden on cable systems. 18 
This list reflects the intricate compromise hammered out by 
Congress. 19 The purposes of the Cable Act are many, and occasion-
ally border on being contradictory, because Congress was attempt-
ing to balance conflicting interests of the regulators (the franchising 
authorities), the regulated (the cable companies), and the public.20 
Nonetheless, several early interpretations of congressional pur-
pose have missed the full scope of interests that Congress was trying 
to accommodate. The clearest misstatement was made by the FCC 
in its primary Rule Making on the Cable ACt.21 After stating that "in 
17 The major sections of the Cable Act that are not in Title Six involve pole attach-
ments, sec. 4 (amending Title Two); unauthorized reception of satellite programming, 
sec. 5 (Title Seven); the Telecommunications Policy Study Commission, sec. 8 (Title 
Seven). 
18 Cable Act § 601, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985). 
19 In the words of the lead sponsor of the Cable Act in the House of Representatives: 
"This legislation has not been put together hastily; it is a carefully crafted set of com-
promises that has emerged from over 3 years of hearings, discussions, and negotiations 
by members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and representatives of the 
cities, the cable industry, and many others." 130 CONGo REC. HIO,435 (daily ed. Oct. I, 
1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 
20 See 130 CONGo REC. S14.283 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwa-
ter) (The Cable Act is "proconsumer, procity, and procable."). 
21 See Implementation, supra note 10. 
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adopting appropriate regulatory standards we must keep in mind 
the underlying purposes of the Cable Act,"22 the FCC described, 
with selective quotations, the goals of the Cable Act as stated in the 
Act itself: 
Foremost among these [purposes] is the intent of the statute 
to establish "standards which encourage the growth and de-
velopment of cable systems ... assure that cable communica-
tions provide ... the widest possible diversity of information 
sources and services to the public" and "promote competition 
in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulation 
that would impose an undue economic burden on cable 
systems. "23 
This condensation of congressional purpose supports the 
FCC's view that the primary intent of Congress was to "significantly 
deregulate the provision of cable service."24 A deleted phrase of 
the statutory purpose, however, expresses congressional support for 
franchise standards and procedures "which assure that cable systems 
are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community .'~25 
The complete statutory language indicates that Congress was as 
concerned with guaranteeing the continuation of necessary regula-
tory oversight of cable systems, as it was with removing unnecessary 
regulation. The court that reviewed the FCC's rulemaking recog-
nized that Congress was attempting to strike a balance between 
these interests. "In establishing regulatory guidelines, Congress 
was concerned both with relieving the cable industry from unneces-
sary, burdensome regulation and with ensuring that cable systems 
remain responsive to the needs of the public."26 
Several courts have been as myopic as the FCC, however, in 
describing congressional intent. For instance, one narrow question 
was whether the automatic five percent annual rate increase, avail-
able to cable operators whose rates were regulated,27 could be taken 
twice within a few months if the months were in different calendar 
years. One court relied on "Congress' unmistakable intent to limit 
governmental rate regulation in favor of marketplace competi-
22 Id. at 18,652. 
23 Id. at 18,652-53. 
24 Id. at 18,650 n.69. , 
25 Cable Act § 601(2), 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
26 ACLU V. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). In 
fact, the court appeared to chide the FCC for its one-sided interpretation. While revers-
ing an FCC decision limiting the "tiers" of programming subject to rate regulation, the 
court stated that, "the Commission invokes what it perceives to be the general deregu-
latory focus of the Act." Id. slip op. at 33. 
27 See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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tion."28 This statement of purpose was irrelevant to the issue 
before the court, since the problem before the court covered rates 
which Congress had determined could be regulated. Moreover, Con-
gress did indeed believe that, in localities where true competition 
exists, rate regulation was unnecessary.29 Congress also stated that 
such regulation was still needed, and thus would be permitted wher-
ever cable systems were not subject to effective competition.30 This 
court did not address this countervailing interest. 
In Tribune-United Cable of Montgomery County v. Montgomery 
County,31 the Fourth Circuit considered whether a franchising au-
thority had the power to penalize a cable operator for violations of a 
franchise provision after the operator had sought to obtain modifi-
cation of that provision.32 The court gave a subtle reemphasis of 
Congressional intent: 
The purposes and thrust of the Act, however, evince a con-
gressional desire that franchise agreements be applied and 
modified so as to obtain a realistic and flexible regulatory 
framework recognizing the needs of both local governments 
and cable operators, but primarily concerned with providing viable 
cable systems responsive to the needs and interests of the local communi-
ties they serve. 33 
The Fourth Circuit omitted from its description of intent, the 
statutory language expressing the congressional desire that 
franchising procedures "assure" the responsiveness of cable sys-
tems to the needs and interests of their communities.34 By over-
looking the word "assure," the court appeared to devalue the role 
Congress intended for local regulatory control. 35 Instead, the court 
28 Town of Barnstable v.TCI-TAFT Cablevision Assoc., No. 86-0143 slip op. (D. 
Mass. May 13, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File). See infra note 149 and accompa-
nying text. 
29 "[T]he availability of competing sources of programming in a given market will 
keep the rates for basic cable services reasonable in that market without the need for 
regulation." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25. For a discussion of the rate deregula-
tion provision, Cable Act § 623,47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. III 1985), see notes 127-79 and 
accompanying text. 
30 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25. 
31 784 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1986). 
32 Cable Act § 625, 47 U.S.C. § 545 (Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 179-95 and ac-
companying text. 
33 Tribune-United Cable, 784 F.2d at 1231 (emphasis added). 
34 Cable Act § 601(2), 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
35 The legislative history stresses congressional "reliance on the local franchising 
process as the primary means of cable television regulation, while defining and limiting 
the authority that a franchising authority may exercise through the franchise process." 
HOUSE REPORT, supm note 8, at 19; see Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enter., 633 F. 
Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Del. 1986) (describing one of the purposes of the Cable Act as 
making "the local franchising process the primary means of cable television 
regulation "). 
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erroneously implied a congressional determination that an econom-
ically "viable" system will be "responsive" to the community.36 
The court in Housatonic Cable Vision Co. v. Department of Public 
Utility Control,37 produced a more sophisticated arid more accurate 
analysis of congressional intent. That court concluded that Con-
gress obviously had not intended to preempt all local regulation,38 
but instead had chosen, "to create a finely-tuned system coordinat-
ing federal, state, and local authority and also to preserve those pro-
visions of existing franchises that were not inconsistent with the 
Cable Act."39 . 
Therefore, the question on any given issue of cable regulation 
remains as to what level of government Congress granted authority. 
The court in Housatonic Cable Vision held that a local regulation 
would be struck down if it would "frustrate the effectiveness of the 
Cable Act,"40 but will be .valid if it is "not expressly prohibited and 
can coexist with the Cable ACt."41 Congress established a presump-
tion that most regulatory power would reside at the 10callevel,42 but 
intended that the courts should decide to what extent local power 
had been limited. In City of New York v. FCC,43 the court erroneously 
stated that Congress intended to "balance" the regulatory jurisdic-
tion of local authorities with that of the FCC: "The Cable Act sought 
to balance two conflicting goals: 'preserv[ing] the critical role of mu-
nicipal governments in the franchise process, , . . . while affirming 
the FCC's 'exclusive jurisdiction over cable service, and overall facil-
ities which relate to such service .... ' "44 There are two errors in 
this analysis. First, unlike the description of the "critical role" of 
local governments, the statement in the House Report discussing 
the FCC's role does not come from the congressional statement of 
36 Tribune-United Cable, 784 F.2d at 1231. 
37 622 F. Supp. 798 (D. Conn. 1985). 
3H See, e.g., Cable Act § 636(b), 47 U.S.C. § 556(b) (Supp. III 1985) ("Nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to restrict a State from exercising jurisdiction with regard 
to cable services consistent with this subchapter."); see also supra note 20. 
39 Housatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 812. The court refers to this balance as a 
"combination of preemption and preservation." Id. at 802. The court also concluded 
that one of the underlying purposes of the Cable Act was "to maximize the availability 
and diversity of cable service." Id. at 811; accord Rollins Cahlevue, IIlC., 633 F. Supp. at 
1318. 
40 Housa/ollic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 806 (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 u.S. 637, 
652 (1971)). 
41 Id. 
42 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24 ("[Clity officials have the best understand-
ing of local communications needs .... "); see also supra text accompanying note 25. 
43 814 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding most FCC preemption of local regula-
tion of technical standards). 
44 Id. at 723 (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19, 95) (citations omitted). 
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the goals of the Cable Act,45 but the Report's "Section-By-Section 
Analysis." Moreover, the court omitted a key phrase from the 
House Report; the actual sentence referring to the FCC's jurisdic-
. tion reads, "Subsection (a)(l) grants the FCC exclusive jurisdiction 
over cable service ... and over the facilities which relate to such 
service, as provided in Title VI [the Cable Act]."46 Thus, instead of 
issuing a broad policy statement in favor of FCC preemption, Con-
gress did the reverse and limited the powers of the FCC to those 
specifically enumerated in the Cable Act. The court also erred in 
concluding that Congress intended the Cable Act to endorse the 
policies of the FCC that predated the Act: "Since Congress legis-
lated against the backdrop of the Commission's preexisting preemp-
tion regulation without criticizing that regulation, we infer that Congress 
endorsed it, except where the Cable Act explicitly or implicitly mod-
ified its provisions."47 This re~soning is faulty since Congress was 
dissatisfied with the regulatory structure that was in existence and, 
in particular, with the FCC.48 In describing the necessity for federal 
statutory guidelines, Congress stated that local franchising would, 
"be based on certain important uniform Federal standards that are 
. not continually altered by Federal, state or local regulation."49 
Congress intended that the true balance be struck between the stat-
utory limitations imposed by the Cable Act and the remaining pow-
ers of local franchising authorities. 
Where to strike this balance will not always be obvious. A care-
ful reading of the purposes should inform courts that Congress did 
not intend for there to be simple answers. The Cable Act is "a care-
fully crafted set of compromises,"5o balancing competing and con-
flicting interests. The difficult task assigned to the judiciary is to 
ensure the maintenance of that precarious balance sought by Con-
gress, i.e., to "[protect] the interests of not only the cities and the 
cable industry, but those of the consumers of cable services as 
45 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19-23, 40. 
46 [d. at 95 (emphasis added). 
47 City of New York v. FCC, 814 F.2d at 725 (emphasis added). 
48 As Judge Mikva argued in his dissent, Congress concluded that "[e]xisting regula-
tory schemes, conceived in cable's infancy or before, were inadequate to the burgeoning 
industry. Since Congress was constructing from the ground up, it is incongruous to 
presume it intended to preserve all elements of the previous makeshift approach unless 
it specifically disclaimed them." [d. at 730 (Mikva, J., dissenting in part). 
49 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24. See also 130 CONGo REC. H 10,444 (daily ed. 
Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Markey) ("[I]f the House fails to pass a Federal cable 
policy, then our cities will be robbed of their control over cable TV. The era of deregu-
lation, affirmed by the FCC and the Supreme Court, has hit cable regulation with a crip-
pling force."). 
50 130 CONGo REC. HIO,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1. 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 
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well. "51 
B. Retroactivity and Grandfathering 
Cable television has been subject to local governmental reg-
ulation since its inception, more than three decades before the 
Cable Act.52 While the Act explicitly governs franchises awarded 
or renewed after the Act's effective date,53 a different analysis is 
needed to determine the validity of laws, regulations, and 
franchise agreements that predate the Act. There are two related 
issues: 1) whether the provisions of the Act are to apply retroac-
tively; and 2) whether prior regulatory obligation is continued in 
effect by the Act's "grandfather" provisions. 
In Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC,54 the court held that 
the Cable Act's provision invalidating the FCC's regulation of the 
amount of franchise fees55 did not apply to franchise fee disputes 
that arose prior to the effective date of the Act. 56 This ruling is 
entirely in keeping with the "venerable rule of statutory interpre-
tation ... that statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities 
are presumed to have only prospective effect."57 
As noted in Yakima Valley Cablevision,58 the Cable Act itself 
provides for a prospective effective date "[ e ]xcept where other-
wise expressly provided, the provisions of this Act and the 
amendments made thereby shall take effect 60 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act. "59 
The existence of a prospective effective date strongly sug-
51 130 CONGo REC. SI4,284 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
52 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23; see also Community Communications CO. V. 
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) (describing cable television's 
tradition of government regulation), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). 
53 See, e.g., Cable Act § 624(b), 47 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. III 1985) (delimiting the scope 
of regulation of cable services, facilities and equipment, "[i]n the case of any franchise 
granted after the effective date of this subchapter."). The Cable Act became effective 
December 29, 1984. . 
54 794 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
55 Cable Act § 622(i), 47 U.S.C. § 542(i) (Supp. III 1985); see also HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 65 ("The current FCC regulations which restrict the use of franchise fee 
revenues to cable-related uses and permit franchise fees of five percent only if a waiver is 
granted by the FCC are invalid by the terms of this legislation."). 
56 Yakima Valley Cablevision, 794 F.2d at 747. 
57 Bennett V. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985) (citations omitted). 
58 Yakima Valley Cablevision, 794 F.2d at 747. 
59 Cable Act § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 542(i) (Supp. III 1985); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 96 ("The provisions of [the Cable Act] will take effect 60 days after enactment 
of the act, except where otherwise expressly provided."). The Cable Act establishes 
different effective dates for the provision of lock boxes, Cable Act § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 544(d)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985) (180 days after the effective date), and preemption of 
rate regulation, Cable Act § 623(c), 47 U.S.C. § 543(c) (Supp. III 1985) (local rate regu-
lation permitted for two years from effective date). 
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gests that Congress intended to only govern arrangements that 
followed that date. If Congress had wished to alter rights or obli-
gations arising prior to the passage of the Act, the relevant gov-
erning provisions would have been made effective immediately. 
The court's finding that the Cable Act is not to be applied 
retroactively is consistent with both the Act itself and prior court 
rulings on retroactivity.60 The court, however, in its analysis, 
seems to confuse retroactivity with grandfathering. The funda-
mental distinction between the two concepts is that a statute with 
retroactive effect changes rights and liabilities that have accrued 
prior to its enactment,61 while grandfathering continues the force 
of a law or franchise subsequent to the law's effective date. 
The court found one issue for which the Act was intended to 
have a retroactive effect: "Congress intended to make only one 
narrow exception to the prospective effect of the Cable Act's 
franchise-fee provisions."62 That "exception" provides that a 
franchise provision requiring a five percent franchise fee is valid 
without FCC approval,63 even though prior to the Cable Act FCC 
permission was necessary before a fee greater than three percent 
could be assessed.64 To prove the retroactive nature of this pro-
vision, the court quoted from the Conference Report: 
Any franchise in effect on the effect [sic] date of [the 
Cable Act] that provides for a franchise fee in an amount up to 
or in excess of the five percent limitation in section 
622(b)(with or without the need for action by any Federal 
agency) shall be deemed to have lawfully required such fee, up 
to but not in excess of five percent, as of such effective date, ex-
cept that where a franchise explicity [sic] establishes a later 
date or any condition for the imposition of such fee, such later 
date or condition shall apply.65 
The court incorrectly concluded that the language in the Con-
ference Report, "makes it clear that any payments of franchise fees 
already [i.e., prior to the Act] made by a cable system up to five per-
cent would be lawful without FCC permission if the franchise agree-
60 See Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 
416 U.S. 696 (1974); Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hastings v. 
Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), mi. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). 
(; I l'akima Valley Cablroision, 794 F.2d at 745-46. 
(;2 [d. at 747. 
63 Cable Act § 622(b), 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (Supp. III 1985); see also HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 64 (The Cable Act grants "the authority to collect franchise fees up to 
five percent without an FCC waiver."). 
H4 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984) (deleted and removed 1985). 
(;5 I'akima Valley Cabiroision, 794 F.2d at 747 (quoting 130 CONGo REC. S14,285 (daily 
ed. Oct. 11, 1984)) (emphasis added). 
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ment established such a fee."66 To the contrary, the provision only 
applies as of "the effect[ive] date of [the Cable Act]." That is, after 
December 29, 1984, a franchise provision calling for a five percent 
fee became enforceable, even without FCC approval. Neither the 
statutory language nor the legislative history indicate that such a 
provision was to be considered valid for time periods prior to the 
effective date. 
Thus, the court was in error when it treated the Conference 
Report as implying a retroactive effect to the provision eliminating 
the need for FCC approval of five percent franchise fees. Congress 
did not retroactively make valid a franchise provision that was inva-
lid prior to the Act. Instead, Congress grandfathered the provision 
so that it would be valid after the effective date of the Act.67 
There are several other provisions of the Cable Act that grand-
father preexisting requirements. The broadest provision preserves 
in effect, "[t]he provisions of ... any franchise in effect on the effec-
tive date of this subchapter ... subject to the express provisions of 
th O b h t "68 IS SU C ap er .... 
Other provisions permit regulation provided in pre-Act 
franchises that would not be allowed for newer franchises. For ex-
ample, although the Act prevents a franchising authority from en-
forcing post-Act requirements that a cable operator provide 
"particular video or other information services"69 and any service, 
facility, or equipment not related to the operation of a cable sys-
tem,70 a franchising authority may enforce any franchise require-
ment for services, facilities, and equipment which was in effect prior 
to the Act. 71 
66 [d. (emphasis added). 
67 The Conference Report contains language that may run counter to this 
conclusion: 
Nothing in section 622 shall authorize any payment toward any such fee ... [i.e., a 
franchise fee in an amount up to or in excess of the 5 percent limitation in 
section 622(b)] for any period prior to the effective date of this title, unless 
such payment has been made prior to such date to a franchising authority. 
130 CONGo REC. SI4,285 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (emphasis added). The italicized lan-
guage seems to imply that if a fee payment had been made prior to the Act's effective 
date, then Cable Act § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. III 1985) would authorize such pay-
ment. There are two problems with this interpretation. First, it seems to contradict the 
earlier quoted language beginning the validating effect of section 622 "as of" the Act's 
effective date. See supra text accompanying note 66. Second, there is no language in the 
statute itself stating that it is to have retroactive effect. 
68 Cable Act § 637(a), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a) (Supp. III 1985). 
69 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 68 (discussing Cable Act § 624(b), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 544(b) (Supp. III 1985)). 
70 Cable Act § 624(a), 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. III 1985). 
71 !d. at § 624(c), 47 U.S.C. § 544(c) (Supp. III 1985). Similarly, all payments by a 
cable operator for support of public, educational and governmental access, required in a 
pre-Act franchise, are exempt from the five percent franchise fee ceiling. [d. at § 622 
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The court in Housatonic Cable Vision held that these sections pro-
tect obligations imposed, not only in the original franchise as 
drafted, but as amended by modification, ordinance, or regulation 
prior to the Act: "The breadth of the Cable Act's definition of 
franchise, coupled with the legislative history, permits the interpre-
tation that the relationship of the parties as it stood at the time the Act 
became iJfective represents the franchise for purposes of the grandfa-
ther provisons."72 
There is one aspect of this court's discussion which may cause 
some unnecessary confusion. The court did not discuss section 
637(a)(2),73 which grandfathers, for the duration of franchises that 
were in effect before the Act, provisions of "any law of any State ... 
in effect on October 30, 1984, or any regulation promulgated pursu-
ant to such law, which relates to such designation, use or support of such 
[public educational or governmental access} channel capacity."74 
Section 637(a)(lf5 differs from section 637(a)(2) in important 
respects. The former subsection applies to franchise provisions, 
while the latter applies to laws and regulations. The former applies 
to all areas of cable policy; the latter, only applies to access. 
A key distinction between the two sections concerns the ability 
of government to impose new requirements on an existing 
franchise. Section 637(a)(l) bars the imposition of new franchise· 
terms, after the Act, to currently running franchises. Though sec-
tion 637 (a)(2) also bars the application of new statutes to existing 
franchises, it permits the imposition of new regulations on existing 
franchises, if the regulation is promulgated under a law that pre-
dates the Cable Act. 76 
The controlling statutory language states that "any law ... in 
(g)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(2)(B) (Supp.III 1985). For post-Act franchises, only "capi-
tal costs" for access facilities are exempted. Id. at § 622(g)(2)(C), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 542(g)(2)(c) (Supp. III 1985). 
72 Housatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 810 (emphasis added). 
73 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
74 Cable Act § 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
This subsection states that the word "State" is to be interpreted "as defined in section 
153(v) of this title." Id. The Cable Act contains no section so demarked. Rather, sec-
tion 602(15), 47 U.S.C. § 552(15) (Supp. III 1985) defines "State" to mean "any State, 
or political subdivision, or agency thereof." Presumably, that definition is meant to ap-
ply to section 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
75 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). 
7() Another interesting difference is that section 637(a)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(l) 
(Supp. III 1985) preserves franchises in effect prior to the effective date of the Cable Act 
(Dec. 29, 1984), while section 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) pre-
serves laws in effect on the date of enactment (OCl. 29, 1984). Apparently, Congress was 
more afraid that onerous laws would be passed by state legislatures during the 60-day 
period between enactment and the effective date than that onerous terms would be 
placed in the negotiated franchise. 
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effect on October 30, 1984, or any regulation promulgated pursuant to 
such law,"77 shall apply for the term of existing franchises. The lim-
iting language "in effect on the date of the enactment" only applies 
to the word "law." There is no limitation on the word "regulation" 
except that the regulation be promulgated pursuant to a law in ef-
fect when the Act was enacted.78 Such limitation could have been 
easily created if Congress had instead used the language "any law or 
regulation in effect on the date of enactment of this section." 
The legislative history makes clear that this interpretation re-
flects true congressional intent, and not a mere syntactical error on 
the part of the drafters of the Cable Act. The Committee Report 
explains that the words "on the date of enactment" were added to 
section 637(a)(2) for "clarifying that only an existing state law, and any 
regulation promulgated under such a law, related to public, educa-
tional or governmental access, are ... grandfather[ed]."79 Again, 
the time limitation only applies to the law, not the regulation 
promulgated pursuant to the timely law. Congress surely would 
have utilized the simpler phrase, "an existing state law or regula-
tion," had it intended to limit the grandfathering to only access-re-
lated regulations in effect when the Act became effective. 
Thus, the Housatonic Cable Vision court's conclusion that 
grandfathering only applies to the relationship between parties "as 
it stood at the time the Act became effective"80 is not completely 
accurate. The conclusion does not apply to the narrow category of 
regulations, relating to public, educational, or governmental access, 
which have been promulgated pursuant to laws in effect when the 
Act became effective.8l Such regulations may apply to existing 
franchises. 
77 Id. § 637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
78 See Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the COQ."(-
ial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543, 586-87 (1985) ("The presumed logic behind this retroac-
tive application ... is that once the empowering statute had been enacted, the cable 
operators were on notice that such access-related requirements could be 
promulgated."). 
79 130 CONGo REc. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (emphasis added). 
HO Housatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 810. 
81 This analysis also explains the court's statement that, "[o]nce the Cable Act be-
came effective, the DPUC [Department of Public Utility Control] lost the power to im-
pose new obligations ... in the middle of a franchise term by adopting regulations and 
issuing orders." Housatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 809. "Power," as interpreted by 
the court, refers to the substantive power of a state to prohibit a franchisee from charg-
ing contributions in aid of construction to a resident of sparse areas. /d. at 808. Section 
637(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 557(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985) does not apply because the regulation 
did not relate to public, educational and governmental access. Additionally, it seems the 
DPUC lost its power because the DPUC had regulated cable "in the same manner as 
pubic utilities," and section 621(c), 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (Supp. III 1985) "expressly abol-
ishes the power of states to regulate cable systems as public utilities." HOl/satollie Cable 
Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 809. 
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C. Constitutionality of Cable Regulation 
The operation of a cable television system "plainly impli-
cate[s] First Amendment interests."82 Not surprisingly, many 
types of cable regulation have been challenged as violative of the 
first amendment. The United States Supreme Court has heard 
cases attacking indecency regulation,83 exclusive fr~mchises84 and 
mandatory public access.85 Lower federal courts have also faced 
issues on the constitutionality of revocation of franchises,86 re-
quired carriage of broadcast signals87 and franchise fees.88 
The Supreme Court has yet to speak definitively on the con-
stitutionality of such requirements, and has not yet formulated a 
standard for evaluating their validity.89 The lower court's hold-
ing, which struck down cable indecency, was affirmed without 
opinion,90 the public access case was decided on statutory 
82 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 106 S. Ct. 
2034,2037 (1986). 
83 Wilkinson v.Jones, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987), aff'g, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), 
aff'g sub nom. Community Television of Utah v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 
1985). 
84 See Prefemd Communications, 106 S. Cl. at 2034, aff'g on different grounds, 754 F.2d 
1396 (9th Cir. 1985). The Courts of Appeals have faced the first amendment issue also. 
See Omega Satellite Prod. v. City ofIndianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Commu-
nity Communications, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-80 (10th Cir. 1981), 
cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). 
85 Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 440 U.S. 689 (1979), aff'g on statutory grounds, 571 
F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). The most recent court case upheld the constitutionality of 
public access requirements. Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 
976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). 
86 See, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 
891,899-903 (W.O. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
1358 (1987); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
87 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, lO6 S. 
Ct. 2889 (1986). 
88 Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.O. Pa 1987). 
89 See Preferred Communications, 106 S. Cl. at 2038-39 (B1ackmun, J.,concurring): 
In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable access, [to utility 
poles] the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable televi-
sion make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application 
of an already existing standard or whether those characteristics require a new 
analysis. . .. [Because the record on the motion to dismiss lacked] factual 
information about the nature of cable television ... the Court does not at-
tempt to choose or justify any particular standard. 
90 Wilkinson v.Jones, 107 S. Cl. 1559 (1987), aff'g, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), 
aff'g sub nom. Community Television of Utah v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 
1985). The lower court relied on three different grounds for striking down the law: 
(1) preemption by the Cable Act, 611 F. Supp. at 1105 (see infra text accompanying notes 
115-123); (2) unconstitutional vagueness, id. at 1117 (stating that defining indecent pro-
gramming by its "time, place, manner, and context" failed to describe with "narrow 
specificity" which programs were prohibited); (3) overbreadth, id. at 1106-15 (stating 
that the only cable programming that could be regulated was that which was obscene 
under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973); see also infra note 115). Although a 
summary affirmance constitutes the Court's holding as to the merits of a case, Hicks v. 
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grounds91 and the franchising case was remanded so that factual 
questions could be resolved prior to the Court's resolution of the 
constitutional issue. 92 
In evaluating the constitutionality of cable regulation, courts 
should recognize that Congress has spoken on many of these is-
sues and should pay particular heed to Congress' reasoning.93 In 
1973, the Court, when faced with a constitutional challenge to an 
FCC policy permitting broadcasters to refuse to accept paid ad-
vertisements,94 noted that Congress had left the question to the 
FCC. The FCC had concluded that "on balance the undesirable 
effects ... would outweigh the asserted benefits."95 Since the 
balancing of competing rights to free expression in the electronic 
media was so difficult, the Court stressed that considerable 
weight should be given to the congressionally created statutory 
framework: 
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in 
the broadcast media and determining what best serves the 
public's right to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and 
difficulty .... 
. . . [W]hen we face a complex problem with many hard 
questions and few easy answers we do well to pay careful attention 
to how the other branches of Government have addressed the same 
problem.96 
Certainly not all congressional regulation of the electronic me-
dia is per se constitutiona1.97 The point is that courts must acknowl-
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), the Court has stressed that a summary affirmance 
does not affirm the rationale behind a judgment, only the judgment itself. Mandel v. 
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). Thus, especially when there is more than one ration-
ale for a holding, it is impossible to tell the reasoning endorsed by the Court. See 
Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176 (stating that a summary affirmance "should not be understood 
as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the 
particular facts involved"). See also id. at 180 (Brennan, j., concurring) (stating that 
judges mllst determine whether a summary disposition "not even arguably [rests] upon 
some alternative nonconstitutional ground"). Accordingly, the Court's affirmance can-
not necessarily be relied upon as a ground breaking precedent holding all regulation of 
cable indecency unconstitutional. 
91 Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 709 n.19. The Supreme Court did state that the first 
amendment issue "is not frivolous." [d. 
92 Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038. 
93 The proper ultimate resolution of these constitutional questions is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
94 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
95 [d. at 122. 
m; [d. at 102-03 (emphasis added). 
97 E.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down ban on 
editorializing by noncommercial broadcasters who received funding from the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting). 
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edge and weigh congressional judgment. 
This deference is especially appropriate for the issues covered 
by the Cable Act. The legislative history indicates an extraordinary 
congressional concern with protecting and enhancing the first 
amendment rights of the cable operatorY8 Additionally, the cable 
industry was intimately involved. in the drafting of the regulatory 
provisions of the Cable Act and supported the Act's passage.99 Ac-
cordingly, courts should recognize that in enacting the Cable Act, 
Congress, far from ignoring the first amendment rights of cable op-
erators, exhibited great sensitivity to their interest in free 
expreSSIOn. 
Despite the deference due Congress, many courts analyzing 
constitutional questions have failed to consider, let alone respect, 
this careful congressional balancing. For example, in Century Federal, 
Inc. v. City of Palo Alto,IOO the court found an exclusive franchising 
arrangement to be unconstitutional. 101 The court noted that the 
Cable Act had indeed been passed and stated that, "[t]he Act was 
intended to establish a comprehensive national [cable] policy and 
envisions a franchising arrangement such as that proposed by the 
[defendant] Cities .... The constitutionality of that Act is not being 
directly challenged in this litigation .... "102 There is no mention of 
either the Act or the congressional determinations in the rest of the 
case. 
Thus, the court, though striking down an exclusive franchise, 
did not address the significance of the provision indicating the con-
trary congressional view. Section 541 (a)( 1) authorizes such 
franchise arrangements: "A franchising authority may award, in accord-
ance with the provisions of this title, 1 or more franchises within its juris-
98 See e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26 (Congress "does not believe it is appro-
priate for government officials to dictate the specific programming to be provided over a 
cable system, and [the Cable Act] reflects this determination."); id. at 34-35 (an access 
requirement "does not chill the cable operators' speech"); id. at 69 (The Act "protects 
the cable operator from being forced to provide specific programming."). 
!J!) The Chair of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which hadjurisdic-
tion over the Cable Act, described the industry's involvement with the legislation: 
I requested the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
to sit at the negotiating table with the National Cable Television Association 
to work out joint legislative recommendations ... regarding cable legislation . 
. . . After months of difficult negotiations, the parties arrived at a com-
promise agreement. The bill we are considering today is supported by all of 
these groups. 
130 CONGo REC. HIO,442 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
100 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal 1986). 
101 The court found insufficient justification for the exclusive franchise and also con-
cluded that cable television should not necessarilv receive the same level of first amend-
ment protection applied to the broadcast media.' Id. at 1475. 
IO:! !d. at 1468 n.4 (citation omitted). 
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diction." \03 This language explicitly gives local governments the 
power to decide on a single franchise: Moreover, Congress ex-
plained that the obvious interpretation was also the correct one: 
"This provision grants to the franchising authority the discretion to 
determine the number of cable operators to be authorized to pro-
vide service in a particular geographic area."I04 
In another case involving exclusive franchises, the Ninth Circuit 
appeared to disregard both the plain meaning of the Cable Act and 
its legislative history in finding the Act consistent with a holding that 
such franchising was unconstitutional. \05 The court seemed to limit 
section 544(a)(1) \06 to merely an authorization for "the government 
to protect its interest in regulating disruption of public resources 
through a system oj permits or jranchises."I07 The court stated that it 
could not agree "with the suggestion in the legislative history" that 
cities had the discretion to select the number of operators that 
would be permitted to wire the community, stating that, "[a] con-
struction of such breadth would be invalid." \08 
A court certainly should strive to construe statutes so as to 
avoid finding them unconstitutional. \09 Nonetheless, it may not re-
write the statute in conflict with clear legislative language. I \0 
More significantly, both these decisions on franchising, as well 
as several other opinions, III have overlooked the directive of the 
Supreme Court. I 12 Congress has painstakingly created a regulatory 
framework which covers regulatory issues including: the granting 
and renewal of franchises, mandatory third party access, and 
103 Cable Act § 621(a)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
104 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 59. 
105 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 
1985), aff'd on different grounds, 476 U.S. 488, 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2037 (1986). 
106 Cable Act § 624(a)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). 
107 Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411 n.ll (emphasis added). 
108 [d. 
109 E.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 113 (1974). 
110 See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
I I I None of the following opinions discuss the congressional balancing of first amend-
ment rights in the area of cable televison: Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (striking down "must-carry" rules that were grandfathered in Cable Act 
§ 624(f)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(f)(2) (Supp. III 1985)), cer/. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); 
TeIe-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (revocation offranchise raises first amendment issue); Central Telecommuni-
cations, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 713-14 (8th' Cir. 1986) (denying 
cable operator's first amendment claim to continue providing service in franchised area), 
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1358 (1987). In contrast, the district court in Central Telecollllllunica-
tions stated that, "it is noteworthy that federal law has acknowledged the authority of a 
local governing body to 'award one or more franchises within its jurisdiction.''' 610 F. 
Supp. 891, 899 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (quoting Cable Act § 621(a)(I), 47 U.S.c. § 541(a)(l) 
(Supp. III 1985)). 
I 12 See supra text accompanying note 96. 
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franchise fees. 113 A court confronted with a constitutional challenge 
to such regulation must pay "careful attention" I 14 to the reasoning 
and determinations of Congress. Even if it ultimately disagrees with 
Congress, the court must explain why it felt constrained to rule the 
opposite way. 
One district court did utilize the Cable Act in a case involving 
the constitutionality of state cable regulation, and concluded that 
the Cable Act preempted state regulation of "indecent" cable pro-
gramming. 115 As the court noted, the Cable Act bars states and cit-
ies from imposing "requirements regarding the provision or 
content of cable services, except as expressly provided in this Arti-
cle." 116 Section 638 117 does preserve the ability of state and local 
government to regulate "libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, inva-
sions of privacy, false or misleading advertising, or other similar 
113 In Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.O. Pa. 1987), the 
court ruled that both franchise fees and public access requirements were constitutional. 
Interestingly, although the court relied heavily on the Cable Act's access provisions, 47 
U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985), and the strong congressional support for access, HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 30-36, the court did not discuss the congressional endorsement 
offranchise fees. 47 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. III 1985); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20, 
26. 
114 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973). 
115 Community Television of Utah v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah 
1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 
1559 (1987). The district court was affirmed "on the basis of the reasons stated in the 
opinion." 800 F.2d at 991. "Indecency" is distinct from, and includes far more elements 
than, "obscenity." Indecency encompasses "language that describes [or pictures that 
depict], in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
. . . at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the 
audience." FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting Pacifica 
Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. II at 98 (1975)). Indecent broad-
casts may be barred in the middle of the afternoon. See id. at 750. Obscenity, which is 
not protected by the first amendment, is established through a three-part test: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find that the work, taken as whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest .... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973) (citations omitted). 
It is not clear whether the Cable Act imposes a federal penalty on indecent speech. 
Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. III 1985) criminalizes the cablecasting of pro-
grams that are "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United 
States .... " The phrase "otherwise unprotected"was not defined by the statute, and 
may be interpreted so as not to include indecency. See Meyerson, The Right to Speak, The 
Right to Hear, and The Right Not to Hear: The Technological Resolution to the Cable/Pornography 
Debate, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. _ (1987). Any attempt by any level of government to ban 
indecent cable programming was subject to strong constitutional challenge. See supra 
note 90 for cases discussing this proposistion. 
I J() Cable Act § 624(£)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(£) ( I) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added); see 
also Cable Act § 636(c), 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (Supp. III 1985) (any law "inconsistent with 
this Chapter shall be deemed to be preempted and superseded"). 
117 Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985). 
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laws."118 To decide if state indecency laws are preserved, therefore, 
a court must determine whether indecency is "similar" to obscenity 
and, thus, covered by section 638. 
The district court, in Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkin-
son,119 noted that, although Congress did not use the term "inde-
cency" in section 638, the word was used in two other sections of 
the Act: 120 
These explicit indecency provisions strongly imply that Con-
gress deliberately omitted indecency from the list in § 638. It 
is unlikely that Congress would accidentally omit indecency 
from § 638, which defines important areas of federal, state and 
local power, and remember to include indecency in other sec-
tions of the ACt. 121 
Although the court concluded that the Act "does not preserve 
state power to regulate indecency,"122 it seemed to contradict itself 
by stating that it needed to rule on the constitutionality of indecency 
laws because "[t]he final resolution of the pre-emption [sic] ques-
tion necessarily requires a ruling on the first amendment issue."123 
Indeed, if Congress intended to preempt state indecency regulation, 
there is no need to explore the constitutional question. Congress is 
certainly permitted to preempt regulation that would otherwise be 
permissible. 124 In this area, such preemption may well represent a 
manifestation of the express congressional intent to "assure that 
cable communications provide ... the widest possible diversity of 
118 Id. (emphasis added). 
119 611 F. Supp. at 1102-06. 
120 Cable Act § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985) (permitting local regula-
tion of programming on commercial access channels ifthe programming is "obscene, or 
is in conflict with community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent") 
(emphasis added); Cable Act § 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985) 
(requiring signal blocking devices, so-called "lock boxes" to be provided "[i]n order to 
restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent") (emphasis added). 
The "lock box," which allows a viewer to "lock out" certain channels and keep them off 
the home television screen, was intended by Congress to provide "one means to effec-
tively restrict the availability of [indecent] programming, particularly with respect to 
child viewers. " HOUSE REPORT supra note 8, at 70. 
121 Community Television of Utah, 611 F. Supp. at 1104. It could also be argued that, 
although indecency and obscenity both involve "offensive" depictions of sex, Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. at 746 (Stevens, J., plurality), they are certainly dissimilar in the 
type of material they encompass; "Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the 
normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted stan-
dards of morality." Id. at 740. 
122 Community Television of Utah, 611 F. Supp. at 1105. 
123 Id. The court ultimately found that regulation of indecent cable programming was 
constitutionally prohibited. Id. at 1116-17. 
124 See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (federal preemp-
tion of a state ban on liquor advertisements on cable upheld under the 1934 Communi-
cations Act). 
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information sources and services to the public." 125 
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CABLE ACT SECTIONS 
A. Rate Regulation 
One of the major changes created by the Cable Act was the 
deregulation of subscriber rates for "basic cable service" in 
franchise areas where the cable system was "subject to effective 
competition."126 The FCC was given authority to define such 
"effective competition," and, after a two year transition pe-
riod, 127 franchising authorities have only been permitted to regu-
late subscriber rates for basic cable service in those localities 
which meet the FCC's definition. In other communities, cable 
operators have been free to increase rates at their own discretion. 
The FCC defined "effective competition" for a cable system 
as occurring when at least three local over-the-air broadcast tele-
vision signals were available in a community.128 A signal was de-
fined as being available if it placed a "predicted Grade B 
contour" over any part of that community or if the signal was 
"significantly viewed." 129 
On appeal, the FCC's determination that three broadcast 
signals created "effective competition" for a cable system was up-
held. 130 The court, however, concluded that the definition of 
"availability" as including a signal that theoretically might cover 
"any" part, no matter how slight, of a community created an 
"enormous margin of error" for determining actual availability 
of signals. 131 The court remanded this part of the rulemaking 
back to the FCC for further examination. 
The court also rejected the FCC's determination that in 
those communities where rate regulation of "basic cable service" 
would be permitted, regulation would be permitted for only one 
125 Cable Act § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (Supp. III 1985). 
121i Cable Act § 623(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (Supp. III 1985). 
127 The transition period ended December 29, 1986 for cable systems franchised 
before the October 30, 1984 enactment of the Cable Act. See Cable Act § 9, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 521 (Supp. III 1985). Franchises awarded after October 30, 1984 wef(~ not under the 
transition rules, but controlled by the FCC's definition of "effective competition" from 
the date it was released, April 19, 1985. Implementation, supra note 10, at 18,648. 
12K See Implementatiol/, supra note 10, at 18,648-50. 
121) /d. at 18,650-51. A "predicted Grade B contour" is an estimate of the strength of 
a broadcast signal. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.683(a) (1985). The estimate does not factor in 
local topographical features, such as mountains, that might interfere with signal recep-
tion, nor does it guarantee that the picture transmitted will be of acceptable quality. 
The FCC decides, based upon percentage of viewership, which channels would be con-
sidered "significantly viewed." See 47 C.F.R. § 76.54 (1985). 
I ~o ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
1:11 /d. at 1573. 
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tier of service that provided service to all subscribers. 132 In hold-
ing that the FCC was bound by the Act's broader definition of 
"basic cable service," 133 the court rejected a statement in the leg-
islative history to the Act that the FCC was free to establish its 
own definition of "basic cable service." The legislative history 
stated that the Act's definition was only for the two year transi-
tion period and that the FCC had "flexibility" in determining its 
definition of "basic cable service." 134 The court rejected this use 
of the legislative history because on the matter of defining "basic 
cable service," the Act speaks "with crystalline darity."135 Since 
the Act itself did not contain any limitation on its definition, the 
FCC did not have the flexibility envisioned in the legislative 
history. 
While most of the legal battles over rate regulation involved 
the FCC's definition of "effective competition,"136 several courts 
have dealt with rate regulation issues outside of the FCC's juris-
diction. Although these cases involve issues that arose during 
the transition period, many of these issues will be relevant to 
those franchises that will continue to be rate-regulated due to a 
lack of "effective competition." 
In Village of Schaumburg v. Cablenet, Inc., 137 a cable operator 
increased subscriber rates over one hundred percent. 138 The Vil-
lage objected on two grounds: 1) the cable company had not 
given the 180-day notice of rate increase required by the Cable 
Act; 139 and 2) the operator had increased rates more than the five 
percent allowed by the Act. 140 
Before reaching the substance of the Village's complaint, the 
court had to rule on the meaning of the word "franchise." Sec-
tion 623(c) permitted rate regulation during the transition pe-
riod, "to the extent provided in a franchise." 141 The franchise 
132 See Implementation, supra note 10, at 18,653. 
133 Cable Act § 602(2),47 U.S.C. § 522(2) (Supp. III 1985), defines "basic cable ser-
vice" as "any service tier which includes the retransmission of local television broadcast 
signals." (emphasis added). 
134 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 66. 
135 ACLU, 823 F.2d at 1568. 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 127-79. 
137 Village of Schaumburg v. Cablenet, Inc., No. 86-C-1710, slip op. (N.D. III. July 31, 
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
13H The monthly charge for basic service increased from $6.25 to $12.95. Id. at screen 
5. 
139 See infra note 147. 
140 See infra note 149. 
141 Cable Act § 623(c), 47 U.S.C. § 543(c) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, section 623(e), 47 U.S.C. § 543(e) (Supp. III 1985) permits a cable operator to 
increase rates five percent a year if the "franchise" does not specify a fixed rate. See infra 
text accompanying note 149. 
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before the court, however, did not contain the specific provisions 
governing local regulation of rates; those details were contained 
ina local ordinance which was referred to in the franchise. 142 
The court ruled that the existence of rate regulation power in the 
ordinance was sufficient to meet the statutory definition. 143 This 
holding reflects both the purpose behind the statutory language, 
which merely required that the cable operator be subject to rate 
regulation prior to the enactment of the Cable Act, and the broad 
statutory definiton of "franchise." 144 
Despite the holding that rate regulation was permitted, the 
court concluded that the rate increase was valid. 145 Even though 
the Cable Act provides for a ISO-day waiting period following a 
request for a rate increase so that a franchising authority can de-
cide whether to veto such an increase,146 the court held that this 
period could be shortened by the franchise. 147 Since the 
franchise only required ninety days notice and the cable operator 
had met that limit, the court held that the time requirement had 
been fulfilled. 148 
Similarly, the court held that the automatic five percent per 
year rise in subscriber rates permitted in the Act 149 could be in-
creased by the franchise. Moreover, if the franchise did not itself 
142 The franchise stated that the cable operator accepted all obligations imposed by 
the ordinance, "to the same degree and extent as if each and every such provision were 
repeated." Village of Schaumburg, at screen 3. 
143 Id. 
144 According to the Cable Act, "franchise" encompasses any authorization for the 
operation of a cable system, "whether such authorization is designated as a franchise, 
permit, license, resolution, contract, certificate, agreement, or otherwise." Cable Act 
§ 602(8), 47 U.S.C. § 522(8) (Supp. III 1985); see Housatonic Cable Vision Co. v. De-
partment of Pub. Uti!. Control, 622 F. Supp. 798, 810 (D. Conn. 1985) (The word 
"franchise" is "broad enough to encompass the wide variety of methods whereby locali-
ties regulated cable systems prior to the Cable Act."); American Television & Communi-
cations Corp. v. City of Montevideo, 603 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (D. Minn. 1985) 
(unilaterally enacted "resolution" by city is within definition of "franchise"); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 127-79. 
145 Village of Schaumburg, at screen 16. 
146 Cable Act § 623(d), 47 U.S.C. § 543(d) (Supp. III 1985). This request is for an 
increase above the five percent automatic increase. See supra text accompanying notes 
127-79. 
147 Village of Schaumburg, at screen 16. 
148 Id. at screen 16. 
149 Cable Act § 623(e)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 543(e)(I) (Supp. III 1985). One court has ruled 
that the statutory language permitting a five percent incre;!se "per year," permits the 
increase each calendar year, rather than after a twelve month period dating from an 
increase. Town of Barnstable v. TCI-Taft Cablevision Assoc., No. 86-0143, (D. Mass. 
May 13, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The automatic increase is available 
unless a franchise, in existence on the effective date of the Cable Act (Dec. 29, 1984), 
specifies "a fixed rate or rates for basic cable service for a specified period or periods 
which would be exceeded if such increase took effect." Cable Act § 623(e)(I), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 543(e)(l) (Supp. III 1985). A franchise that establishes a particular rate does not spec-
ify a "fixed" rate if it permits the rate to be increased with the approval of the franchis-
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limit the increase, the cable operator would be free to raise rates 
by more than five percent. 150 Although the ordinance in Schaum-
burg only gave the Village the power to reject a proposed increase 
by holding a hearing, no hearing was held. The court concluded 
that since nothing in the franchise prevented the doubling of 
subscriber rates, the increase was permissible under the Cable 
Act. 151 
The court's logic in Schaumburg was the same for both of 
these provisions; the Cable Act rate regulation provisions were 
not intended to add any burdens to the cable operator. Accord-
ing to the court, "Congress did not intend to place restrictions 
where none existed . . .. There is no basis to believe that in a 
case such as this, limitations were intended to be imposed which 
were not otherwise established by ordinance or contract."152 
It is not at all clear, however, that the same principle should 
apply to both the five percent increase and the lBO-day provi-
sions. In providing for the automatic rate increase, Congress ex-
plicitly stated that the increase was "[i]n addition to any other 
rate increase which is subject to the approval of a franchising au-
thority."153 Thus, Congress envisioned that a franchise might 
well permit additional rate increases. 154 
In contrast, the Cable Act states that a franchising authority 
has IBO days to render a decision on a request for a rate increase, 
"unless the lBO-day period is extended by mutual agreement of the 
cable operator and the franchising authority."155 There is noth-
ing in the statutory language that permits the time period to be 
reduced by mutual agreement. Congress apparently felt that since 
the cable operator was permitted to raise rates by five percent 
without notice or local approval, franchising authorities should 
be given sufficient time to act on additional increases. Congress 
also determined that IBO days was an appropriate time. 156 Ac-
ing authority. American Television & Communications Corp. v. City of Montevideo, 
603 F. Supp. at 1379. 
150 Cable Act § 623(e)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 543(e)(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
151 Village of Schaumburg, at screen 16. 
152 [d. at screen 17. 
153 Cable Act § 623(e)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 543(e)(l) (Supp. III 1985). 
154 The legislative history also indicates that the five percent increase could be ex-
panded by the franchise; "This automatic increase is not meant to be a ceiling on 
rates .... [Congress] intends that the automatic increase ... shall be available in addi-
tion to any other increase procedure that may be established by a franchise." HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 67-68. 
155 Cable Act § 623(d), 47 U.S.C. § 543(d) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
156 The legislative history also implies no power to shorten the 180-day limit. See 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 67 ("[S]ubsection 623(d) requires that a franchising 
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cordingly, the Schaumburg court may have incorrectly permitted a 
shorter time period than that required by the Cable Act. 
An issue involving rate regulation that may have significant 
ramifications for the future is the meaning of the word "rates." 
Congress has preempted local regulation of "the rates for the 
provision of cable service," except for basic service of those cable 
operators not facing "effective competition."157 "Cable service" 
is defined as consisting of "video programming or other pro-
gramming service together with subscriber interaction, if any, 
which is required for the selection of such programming."158 
Congress, however, did not define either what is meant by "the 
provision of cable service" or even the word "rates." One court 
which has addressed this question thus far has ruled that the 
scope of the federal limit on local regulation of "rates" can only 
be understood in the context of the other provisions of the Cable 
Act affecting local regulatory power. 159 
In Housatonic Cable Vision,160 the court upheld a state prohibi-
tion on a cable company charging subscribers who reside in 
sparsely populated areas as "contribut[or]s in aid of construc-
tion."161 The court ruled that such contributions "are not rates 
for the provision of cable service within the meaning of the Act, 
and that the Cable Act does not preempt franchising authorities 
from making decisions concerning such contributions."162 
What makes this decision significant beyond the question of 
line extension regulation is the reasoning of the court. The court 
based its determination on the fact that a separate section of the 
Act required franchising authorities to assure that access to cable 
service not be denied to any group of potential subscribers be-
cause of the income of those who reside in their neighbor-
hood. 163 The court concluded that "[d]enying franchising 
authorities the power to prohibit contributions in aid" of con-
authority act within 180 days ... unless the l80-day period is extended by mutual 
consent."). 
157 Cable Act § 623(a), (b)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a), (b)(l) (Supp. III 1985). 
ISH HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 41; see Cable Act § 602(5), 47 U.S.C. § 522(5) 
(Supp. III 1985). 
159 Housatonic Cable Vision Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!. Control, 622 F. Supp. 
798,808 (D. Conn. 1985). 
IliO ld. at 798. 
iii I ld. at 802. The court also upheld a requirement that a cable company should wire 
sparsely populated areas, (i.e., areas with fewer than 25 prospective subscribers), as 
within the local government's statutory power. ld. at 807 (citing Cable Act §§ 624(b), 
624(c). 632(a), 47 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 544(c), 522(a) (Supp. III 1985)). 
iii!.! HOl/salonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 808. 
1Ii~ Cable Act § 621(a)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985). 
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struction would be in "direct conflict" with this requirement. (()4 
The conflict would apparently arise since such charges would sin-
gle out one group to pay more for cable service, thereby contra-
dicting the congressional "emphasis on encouraging equal access 
to cable television."165 The court concluded that it would not 
define the ambiguous phrase "rates for the provision of cable 
service" so as to conflict with unambiguous provisions of the 
same statute. Therefore, contributions in aid of construction 
may still be subject to local regulation. 166 
Applying this reasoning, certain other charges by a cable op-
erator may also be subject to local regulation. For example, the 
Cable Act requires every cable operator to sell or lease devices 
called "lock boxes" at their subscribers' requests. These devices. 
permit subscribers to block the reception of certain channels on 
their television sets l67 for the purpose of allowing subscribers to 
keep obscene and indecent programming out of their homes and 
away from their children. 168 Just as Congress stressed the im-
portance of equal access to cable television, it also stressed the 
importance of making lock boxes available to all who wished to 
keep "objectionable" programming out of their homes. 169 
Lock boxes are similar to line extension and do not fit into 
the definition of "cable service" as video programming. 170 As 
with the prohibition on contributions in aid of construction, if 
local governments wish to regulate the price of lock boxes so as 
to ensure their maximum availability, a ban on such regulation 
would "defeat express provisions of the same statute."171 
Similarly, franchising authorities may be able to regulate the 
price subscribers must pay in order to receive access program-
ming. Access programming is programming by third parties 
Hi4 Housatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 808. 
I (;5 [d. at 811. Congress stated that one purpose of the Cable Act was to require that 
"cable service be made available in all areas of a city, so that residents of lower income 
areas are not deprived of cable service." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20. 
I (;(; The court also noted that if contributions in aid of construction were considered 
part of the rates for cable service, such contributions would be barred by Cable Act 
§ 623(£)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 543(£)(1) (Supp. III 1985) which permits both federal and local 
authorities to "prohibit discrimination among customers of basic cable service." Housa-
tonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 808 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 543(e) & (£)). 
)(;7 Cable Act § 624(d)(2)(a), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(a) (Supp. III 1985). 
W/l See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70; see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying 
text. 
I (j!l Congress stated that it was "extremely concerned with the dissemination of pro-
gramming containing explicit sexual material which might be offensive to many cable 
subscribers [and) particularly concerned about the availability of such programming to 
child viewers." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 69. 
I 70 See supra notes 161-66. 
171 HOllJatonic Cable Vision, 622 F. Supp. at 808. 
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other than the cable operators and the programmers they select. 
The Cable Act "grants franchising authorities explicit authority 
to establish requirements for the designation and use of public, 
educational and governmental ("PEG") access channels."172 
These channels were considered by Congress to "serve a most 
significant and compelling governmental interest-promotion of 
the basic underlying values of the First Amendment itself."173 
Significantly, franchising authorities are empowered not 
only to require that channels be set aside for PEG access pro-
gramming, but to "require rules and procedures for the use of 
the channel[s]."174 Therefore, a rule promulgated under this 
section which governs the price consumers are charged to receive 
. PEG access channels would not be preempted by the Cable Act's 
limitation of rate regulation under the reasoning of Housatonic 
Cable Vision. Preemption, if permitted, would conflict with the ex-
plicit statutory goal of utilizing PEG access to create a "wide di-
versity of information sources for the public"175 and "contribute 
to an informed citizenry."176 Moreover, it may well be that fees 
charged by a cable operator for viewing PEG channels are not 
"rates for the provision of cable service"177 since the cable opera-
tor does not "provide" PEG access programming. Access pro-
gramming is "provided" by the individual access programmer; 
cable operators merely act as "conduits" with no editorial discre-
tion. 178 A perfectly consistent way to balance the competing pur-
poses of the Cable Act would be to hold that rates for that 
programming controlled or selected by the cable operator are 
unregulated. The price charged for third party access program-
ming is regulated to ensure, in the words of one legislator, "that 
local community needs for public, educational, and governmen-
tal programming are met." 179 
172 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 45; see Cable Act § 611,47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 
1985). 
173 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 34. "The goal of the First Amendment is to 'fos-
ter' the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources." [d. at 31 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,20 (1945)). 
174 Cable Act § 624(b), 47 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. III 1985). 
175 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 30. 
176 [d. 
177 Cable Act § 623(a), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). 
178 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 35. 
179 130 CONGo REC. HlO,440 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (Remarks of Rep. Rinaldo). Rep. 
Rinaldo continued: "This form of programming is extraordinarily important to the citi-
zens in the communities that are served by cable, and it promises to bring with it a more 
enlightened and better informed citizenry in the years to follow." [d.; see also 130 CONGo 
REC. HlO,444 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Bryant) ("[Clonsumers and 
viewers benefit greatly from [the Cable Act] because public, governmental, and educa-
tional access is guaranteed so the needs of the community can be met."). 
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B. Modification 
Prior to the Cable Act, many companies sought to reduce the 
commitments they had made in their franchises with local 
governments: 
[I]n many cities around the country, in the period before pas-
sage of the Act, cable companies sought to be excused from 
the performance of obligations under their franchise agree-
ments, obligations which they found too onerous or too costly. 
In many of these communities, the franchising authority took 
the position that a cable operator ought to be held to its 
promises. 180 
Congress, in recognition of these disputes,181 created a mecha-
nism whereby a cable operator could force a franchising authority to 
modify franchise commitments. 182 In order to be relieved of a 
franchise requirement for provision of facilities and equipment, the 
operator must demonstrate that the requirement is "commercially 
impracticable."183 This phrase, taken from the Uniform Commer-
cial Code,184 sets a difficult standard for modifying a promise made 
by the cable operator since: there must have been a change in cir-
cumstances; the change must have been unforeseen and unforesee-
able by the cable operator and beyond the operator's control; and 
this change must alter a basic assumption on which the franchise 
was originally based, beyond simply lowering revenue or raising 
expenses. 185 
While the precise circumstances necessary to establish "com-
mercial impracticability" have not yet been judicially determined, 
some important preliminary questions have been faced. In MatrixVi-
sion of Wilmette, Inc. v. Village of Wilmette,186 the court ruled that the 
180 D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO: 
LAW AND POLICY 3-38 (1986). 
181 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 ("The result of the renegotiation process 
has been to create very contentious relationships between franchising authorities and 
cable operators and artificially inflate expectations among consumers."). 
182 Cable Act § 625,47 U.S.C. § 545 (Supp. III 1985). The franchising authority and 
the cable operator remain free to modify the franchise on their own, outside of the pro-
cedures of the Cable Act. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71. 
183 Cable Act § 625(a)(I)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 545(a)(I)(A) (Supp. III 1985). 
184 "'Commercial impracticability' is defined as it is in the Uniform Commercial 
Code, § 2-615. It is intended that this standard will be applied to cable operators' pro-
posals for modification in the same manner that the UCC applies-recognizing that 
courts may need to make distinctions given the difference between the context in which 
it is applied here and that regarding the sale of goods which is governed by the UCC." 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71. 
I Hfj See generally Meyerson, The Cable Communications Poli9 Act of 198-1: A Balancing Act on 
the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543, 573-76 (1985). 
IHG No. 85-C-5784 (N.D. III. Oct. 24, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
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Cable Act does not require a formal request by the operator for a 
modification. In Matrix Vision , the operator's request to modify a 
franchise requirement to construct a second, so-called, "shadow-
trunk" cable was made at a Village hearing held to determine why 
the operator should not be penalized for failing to meet this obliga-
tion. 187 The court held that the Act imposed no requirements "as to 
the context in which such a request for modification is to be 
made.'''88 Rather than "prescribe rigid procedural require-
ments,"189 Congress only required that a "request" of some kind be 
made. 190 While this holding is essentially correct, in the interest of 
fairness it seems clear that however the "request" is made, the oper-
ator must inform the franchising authority that the "request" is dif-
ferent from the normal ongoing discussions between contracting 
parties and that denial of the request could lead to court appeal. 
The court also held that this "request" need not allege, let 
alone show, that the existing franchise requirements are commer-
cially impracticable; 191 that determination is left solely for the re-
viewing courts. There is, however, language to the contrary in the 
legislative history. That language seems to indicate that an opera-
tor, in order to take advantage of the statutorily imposed modifica-
tion procedure, must first give the franchising authority the 
opportunity to determine, for itself, whether a requirement is com-
mercially impracticable. "Under subsections 625 (a) and (b), the 
cable operator may obtain modification of a requirement for facili-
ties and equipment if it can show, in negotiations with the franchise author-
ity or in court if an action is taken, that the existing contract requirement is 
'commercially impracticable.' "192 
Irrespective of section 625, the franchising authority retains the 
power to grant a modification whenever it decides such modification 
is appropriate, even without a showing of commercial impracticabil-
187 ld. at screen 3. The "request" may only have been an oral request; there is no 
reference in the case to any written request for modification. 
188 ld. at screen 7. 
1891d. 
190 ld. The court incorrectly relied on the statement in the legislative history that the 
"procedures established under [Cable Act § 625) are intended to supplement, and not 
replace, other procedures available for modification" to prove that Congress did not 
intend to impose specific procedural requirements. ld. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 71). Even though Congress intended to permit cities and cable operators to 
devise their own procedures for modification, Congress did not intend to include proce-
dural safeguards in the mandatory statutory procedure. The question will be, therefore, 
whether there is any indication that Congress felt that certain safeguards, such as the 
120 days for governmental action on the request, Cable Act § 625 (a)(2), were necessary 
to protect both parties. 
I!J I [d. at screens 8-9. 
I!J2 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71 (emphasis added). 
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ity. Thus, the reference in the legislative history to requiring modi-
fications if commerical impracticability is shown in "negotiations 
with the franchise authority," 193 implies an obligation to give the 
franchising authority the opportunity to decide if the statutory stan-
dard is met before the cable operator may ask a court to review that 
decision. This view is also consistent with the general principle of 
exhaustion of remedies, which requires that a local government be 
permitted to rule on an issue before appeal is taken to the federal 
courts. 194 Since Congress requested that a franchising authority 
make a "final decision" before an appeal can be taken,195 it seems 
likely that Congress intended that the franchising authority be able 
to make its "final decision" after considering the same factors on 
which a court would eventually rule. 
In the other major case on contract modification, Tribune-United 
Cable of Montgomery County v. Montgomery County,196 the Fourth Circuit 
held that a request for a modification "automatically stays any action 
on the part of the franchising authority to enforce the penalty provi-
sions of the franchise agreement until its decision has been final-
ized."197 The court stated that Congress had provided that an 
operator who proves "commercial impracticability" is "relieved en-
tirely from the adverse aspects of those portions of the agree-
ment."198 Accordingly, the court held that the request for 
modification bars the imposition of penalties, not only for violations 
of the franchise after the request, but for those that preceded it as 
well. This bar is only to be lifted after the franchising authority has 
made its decision on the modification request. 199 
The problem with the court's analysis is that the Cable Act 
never states that the operator is to be "entirely" relieved of its con-
tractual obligations. The court's analysis ignores the fundamental 
distinction in contract law between "existing impracticability," when 
the cause of the difficulty exists at the time the contract was signed, 
and "supervening impracticability," when the event occurs after the 
contract is signed.20o This distinction determines the scope of the 
193 [d. 
194 E.g., Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969) (state courts must be given the 
opportunity to rule on federal constitutional issues before appeal to the Supreme 
Court). 
195 Cable Act § 625(b)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 545(b)(l) (Supp. III 1985). 
196 784 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1986). 
197 [d. at 1231. The court indicated that a "bad faith or frivolous application for modi-
fication" would not stay the penalty. [d. 
198 [d. at 1230 (emphasis added). 
199 The Tribune-United Cable court did not comment on whether the penalty must await 
judicial review of the franchising authority's determination . 
. 200 E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 696 (1982). 
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relief available to the party unable to fulfill the contractual obliga-
tion. "The effect of supervening impracticability or frustration on the 
excused party is usually to discharge his remaining duties of per-
formance. The effect of existing impracticability or frustration on the 
excused party is usually to prevent any duty of performance on his 
part from arising."20I 
Thus, the fact that an event has made performance of the con-
tract as originally drafted impracticable does not protect the prom-
isor from being in breach for contract violations that existed before 
the event occurred. The language of the modification provision of 
the Cable Act does not directly or implicitly reverse this black letter 
principle. At a minimum therefore, a franchising authority should 
retain the right to penalize the cable operator for any violation oc-
curing before the alleged impracticability arose. 
Moreover, if the operator is to be protected, at least temporar-
ily, from penalty for its breaches of the franchise agreement, there 
must be a concomitant responsibility on the part of the cable opera-
tor to make the request for modification as soon as the impractica-
bility becomes apparent. Otherwise, an operator could delay 
invoking the procedure right up to the time the franchising author-
ity is ready to impose a penalty for the violation. For example, in 
Tribune-United Cable, the operator violated franchise provisions relat-
ing to wiring deadlines and to the construction of an Institutional 
Network ("I-Net") in addition to the subscriber cable.202 Subse-
quently, the franchising authority issued two formal notices of de-
fault.203 The second threatened "to invoke the penalty provisions 
of the franchise agreement. "204 On November 8, 1985, seven days 
after the second notice and two and one-half years after the 
franchise was signed, the cable operator "formally requested modi-
fication ... pursuant to section 545 of the [Cable Act]. "205 . 
The operator apparently made a deliberate decision not to 
comply with its franchise obligations. The court stated that the op-
erator had, "decided not to construct the I-Net system ... [and] 
ceased laying cable to new areas."206 At minimum, good faith 
20 I Id. at 698. 
202 Tribune-United Cable, 784 F.2d at 1228-29. 
20:1 Id. at 1229. The county sent Tribune the first formal notice of default on Septem-
ber 19, 1985. The second notice was issued on November I, 1985. 
204 Id. 
205 !d. 
20(i !d. Prior to the request for modification, the operator did question "the economic 
feasibility of a number of franchise requirements" and "informally [requested) a review 
of the franchise agreement." Id. It is apparent however, that no notice was given of the 
final decision by the operator to breach its promises until the requirements had been 
violated and the penalty imminent. 
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should have required that notice be given to the franchising author-
ity before the breach began. Such notice would give the county the 
opportunity to make alternate arrangements and possibly change 
the franchise to an intermediate requirement. 
The Fourth Circuit stated that the imposition of the penalty 
should be stayed since, "[s]everely penalizing an embryonic cable 
operation which may be stymied by commercial impracticabilities 
before it has had an opportunity to take advantage of the federally 
mandated right to modification does not strike us as promoting the 
objectives of the Act."207 This reasoning will not help a cable oper-
ator who delays significantly in requesting modification after 
problems have arisen. As soon as the difficulty becomes known, 
however, the operator has this opportunity "to take advantage of 
the ... right to modification."208 A penalty imposed after a substan-
tial delay in requesting a modification (and after a continuing viola-
tion of the franchise), therefore, would be imposed only after the 
operator had the opportunity to request the modification and thus 
would not interfere with the objectives of the Act. 
Finally, it must be noted that the request for modification in this 
case occured before the penalty was imposed. Entirely different con-
siderations would arise if the operator sought to be relieved of a 
penalty by requesting a modification after the penalty had been im-
posed. The court was concerned with cities placing a "burden" on 
the right to modify by imposing penalties.209 Obviously there is no 
such burden if a penalty for a franchise violation is imposed absent 
the request for modification. A subsequent request for modification 
should not affect the validity of a previously imposed and previously 
valid penalty. . 
C. Tenants' Access to Cable Television 
The Cable Act supplements the cable operators' rights 
under a franchise by giving them the right to construct their 
cable systems "over public rights-of-way, and through easements 
... which have been dedicated for compatible uses."2)O Since 
this language specifically encompasses all easements granted to 
utilities, by private as well as by governmental entities,2)) cable 
207 [d. at 1231 (emphasis added). 
201l [d. 
20!) [d. 
210 Cable Act § 621 (a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 54 I (a)(2) (Supp. 111 1985). 
21 I See gml'mlly HOUSE REPORT, supm note 8, at 59 ("Any private arrangements which 
seek to restrict a cable system's use of such easements or rights-of-way which have been 
granted to other utilities are in violation of this section and not enforceable."). 
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operators have sought to use this section to require landlords to 
permit the franchised cable operator to offer service to tenants. 
In the two cases on this issue, Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni 
Enterprises,212 and Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta En-
terprises, Inc. ,213 the courts found that the Cable Act does grant 
cable operators the right to enter private multiple dwellings 
through easements. The difference in the two cases is that in 
Greater Worcester, the court found that the cable operator would be 
unable to offer service to tenants "using only existing utility ease-
ments and public rights-of-way."214 Accordingly, the court ruled 
that the Cable Act did not give the operator the right to use the 
landlord's property to offer service.215 
By contrast, the Rollins court decided that cable operators 
would be permitted to wire the apartment buildings, since the 
apartments were "served by electric, telephone and, most proba-
bly, water and sewer easements."216 While neither court de-
scribes in adequate detail the factual basis for its conclusions, the 
latter approach seems to be more consistent with the legislative 
goal to "insure that the public receives the widest possible diver-
sity of information services and sources."217 Therefore, the 
question should not be whether a "complete" cable system can 
be constructed through easements, but whether the easements 
will lead into individual apartments. 218 If they do, the operator 
should be permitted to provide service to any tenant who wishes 
to pay for it. The resulting wiring would run from the public 
rights-of-way in the street, through the easement, and into the 
apartment of the tenant who desires cable service. No legitimate 
interest of the landlord would be implicated, and the cable wiring 
in the apartment could be removed if the next tenant in the 
apartment did not want the service. 
212 633 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Del. 1986). 
213 No. 85-2022, slip op. (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
214 [d. at screen 42. 
215 [d. at screens 42-43. 
216 Rollins Cablevue, 633 F. Supp. at 1322. 
217 [d. at 1318 (citations omitted). 
218 The landlord in Greater Worcester contended, "as a factual matter, that the utility 
easements [did) not extend into each apartment; at some point in order to wire [the 
apartment complex, the cable operator's) equipment will leave the easements and pass 
onto [the landlord's) property." Greater Worcester, slip op. at screen 40. While the court 
gives no further details about the property, and ultimately concludes that the landlord 
was correct, it is unclear how each tenant was provided with "telephone service, natural 
gas and electricity," id. at screen 38, without the various easements running directly into 
the individual apartments. Either the buildings in the case were of unusual design or the 
court misunderstood both the nature of the easements and the rights under the Cable 
Act. 
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Both courts seemed to agree that state laws granting similar 
or greater access for cable operators to apartment buildings were 
not preempted by section 621. The Rollins court, in fact, used the 
access laws of the State of Delaware to aid in interpreting the 
Cable Act's requirements.219 
The Greater Worcester court found the Massachusetts access 
statute unconstitutional, not because of preemption but because 
. it did not provide compensation for the "taking" of the land-
lord's property by the cable operator.220 This interpretation of 
the state law is questionable, however, since the court also found 
that the federal access provisions did meet the standards of due 
process by requiring that property owners be fully compensated 
for whatever takings might occur from the installation of cable 
facilities.221 The court did not explore whether the federal pro-
visions would provide a landlord adequate compensation for 
damages "caused by the installation, construction, operation, or 
removal of ... [facilities necessary for a cable system] by the 
cable operator,"222 who obtains access under both the federal 
and state access provisions. If such compensation would be avail-
able and sufficient, the Cable Act would, in effect, provide the 
"just compensation" required by the fourteenth amendment,223 
for the state statute's "taking." 
D. Cable Piracy 
The Cable Act contains two sections dealing with cable 
piracy: section 633, which prohibits unauthorized reception of 
"service offered over a cable system"224 and section 605, which 
prohibits unauthorized reception of radio signals.225 Section 633 
is intended to cover theft from the cable system itself, while sec-
tion 605 covers reception of signals transmitted through the 
219 Rollins Cablevue, 633 F. Supp. at 1321. "In resolving the question of the right of 
access, the law of the state in which the cable system is located may be significant." /d. 
The Cable Act, however, does not depend on local laws to govern the use of easements. 
While the Delaware statute led to substantially the same result as the Cable Act, the 
provisions of the Act will have the same meaning even in states lacking a similar law. 
220 Greater Worcester Cablevision, at screens 13, 16, 18. 
221 [d. at screen 41. 
222 Cable Act § 621 (a)(2)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985). 
223 "[NJor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. . 
224 Cable Act § 633(a)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985). 
225 Section 5 of the Cable Act amended the former section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (dealing with unauthorized reception of radio communications) and 
section 6 of the Cable Act redesignated it section 705. Nonetheless, the section was 
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. III 1985). Accordingly, it will be referred to in this 
article as section 605. 
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air.226 One major difference between the two sections is that 
piracy from a cable system for private home use is barred by sec-
tion 633, but the Cable Act exempts from liability the reception 
of over-the-air signals, through home satellite dish antennae, for 
noncommercial private viewing.227 
The major issue that has been litigated in respect to both 
sections is the intent necessary to establish a violation. In She-
nango Cable TV, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 228 a cable company sued the 
parent corporation of Radio Shack for selling a converter which 
enabled subscribers who received the least expensive tier of cable 
service to receive the programming of a more expensive tier 
without paying the cable company an additional fee. 229 The 
court ruled that Radio Shack had not violated section 633 be-
cause the converter was designed and advertised to perform two 
legitimate functions: 1) permitting the use of remote channel 
control; and 2) permitting recording of one cable channel on a 
video casette recorder during the viewing of a different 
channel. 230 
According to the court, under section 633, a manufacturer, 
distributor, or retailer of equipment "is liable only if he intends 
that the equipment he produces and sells be used for the inter-
ception or pirating of cable signals and the equipment is 
designed solely and specifically for that purpose."231 Because it 
was "unquestionably clear" that Radio Shack's converter is "not 
a pirating device designed and/or manufactured to assist a user 
226 The legislative history indicates a congressional intent: 
To limit the applicability of (Cable Act § 633] to theft of a service from the 
point at which it is actually being distributed over a cable system. Thus, situ-
ations arising with respect to the reception of services which are transmitted 
over-the-air (or through another technology), but which are also distributed 
over a cable system, continue to be subject to resolution under section 605 to 
the extent reception or interception occurs prior to or not in connection 
with, distribution of the service over a cable system. 
HOUSE REPORT supra note 8, at 83. 
227 Cable Act § 605(b), 47 U.S.C. § 605(b) (Supp. III 1985). Unauthorized home re-
ception is only prohibited if the programming is scrambled or otherwise encrypted, or if 
there is an established marketing system for a particular programming service. Id. at 
§ 605(b)(I),(2), 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)(I),(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
228 631 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Pa. 1986). 
229 Id. at 836. The lowest tier, costing $8.95 a month, offered six to eight channels of 
cable programming. The next tier, costing an additional $2.75 a month, offered another 
12 channels. Id. at 836 nn.3-4. 
230 Id. at 839. 
231 Id. at 838 (emphasis in original). This is consistent with the legislative history that 
indicates that distributors, manufacturers and retailers should not be held liable for 
equipment, "which is used for legal purposes merely because the same device or equip-
ment is capable of being used for unauthorized reception of cable service, if they do not 
provide the equipment with the intent or specific knowledge that it will be used for the 
unauthorized reception of cable service." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 84. 
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to 'tap' into"232 the cable system, there was no violation of sec-
tion 633.233 
A similar lack of intent to violate the Cable Act protected a 
distributor of home earth station satellite dish antennae in Air 
Capital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communications Group, Inc. 234 In 
Air Capital, the court ruled that section 605, "imposes no duty 
upon [a seller of dish antennae] to advise its customers about 
authorized or unauthorized use of the equipment. "235 A cus-
tomer's illegal reception of certain signals would only be attrib-
uted to a seller or manufacturer of the satellite dish who 
"willfully assists in the violation."236 
Such a willful intent to assist in the violation of the Cable Act 
was found in Storer Communications, Inc. v. Mogel. 237 There, the de-
fendants not only sold equipment capable of receiving cable ser-
vice but "made clear . . . that the purpose of purchasing their 
cable equipment was to enable the purchaser to avoid payment 
for the cable services received, [and] advised [their] customers on 
ways to ensure that the cable operator did not discover the unau-
thorized reception of cable services."238 The court concluded 
without apparent difficulty that the defendants possessed the req-
uisite intent to assist others in violating the Cable Act and that 
their sale of the equipment violated section 633.239 
Similarly, a group of hotels and motels were found to have 
violated section 605 by installing satellite antennae to receive 
programming and retransmit it to their guests' rooms.240 Sec-
tion 605 exempts from liability, "receipt ... of any satellite cable 
programming for private viewing. "241 Even though the viewing 
by hotel and motel guests was arguably "private viewing," the 
court correctly pointed out that the reception of programming by 
232 Shenango, 631 F. Supp. at 840. 
233 [d. 
234 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan. 1985). 
23f; [d. at 1572. The court also ruled that a cable company lacks standing to sue for 
unauthorized reception of a satellite signal. !d. Contra American Televison and Commu-
nications Corp. v. Floken, Ltd., 629 F. Supp. 1462, 1472 (M.D. Fla. 1986). 
236 601 F. Supp. at 1572. The court also quoted comments of Senator Goldwater: 
"These business persons would have to knowingly and willfully assist in enabling a par-
ticular individual to violate the law, not simply be aware that the equipment by itself or 
in combination with other components might possibly be used for prohibited pur-
poses." [d. (quoting 130 CONGo REC. S14,284 (daily ed. Oct. 11,.1984) (comments of 
Sen. Goldwater)) (emphasis omitted). 
237 625 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Fla.1985). 
238 [d. at 1197. 
23!1 Id. at 1198; Cable Act § 633, 47 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III 1985). 
240 American Television and Communications Corp. v. Floken, Ltd., 629 F. Supp. 
1462, 1465 (M.D. Fla 1986). 
24\ Cable.Act § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605(b) (Supp. III 1985). 
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hotels and motels was for "their own commerical advantage."242 
Moreover, legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the 
exemption was only for home viewing.243 
Thus, the courts have been able to draw workable distinc-
tions between legal and illegal unauthorized reception. It is law-
ful to use a satellite dish for private home reception but not for 
exhibition to paying customers. It is lawful to sell equipment that 
permits unpaid access to cable service, but only if the equipment 
is designed for other legitimate uses and is truly marketed only 
for those lawful purposes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In enacting the Cable Act, Congress attempted to "bring our 
outdated communications laws into the information age."244 In 
its first major overhaul of the Communications Act of 1934, Con-
gress established a "national framework and Federal standards 
for cable' franchising. "245 
The Cable Act strives for a difficult balance, minimizing "un-
necessary regulation that would impose an undue economic bur-
den on cable systems,"246 while permitting regulation necessary 
to "assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and in-
terests of the local community. "247 The judiciary has been given 
the primary responsibility of supervising the regulatory players 
and of ensuring that the proper dose of regulation is 
administered. 
This task is not an easy one. The Cable Act is labyrinthine: 
lengthy, prolix, and complicated. The courts will have to proceed 
carefully if Congress' full intent is to be realized. 
242 629 F. Supp. at 1469. 
243 According to the Committee Report: "The term 'private viewing' is intended to 
describe a situation whereby an individual purchases or otherwise acquires satellite re-
ceiving equipment and uses such equipment to receive satellite cable programming 
which he views within his private dwelling place." 130 CONGo REG. SI4,288 (daily ed. 
Oct. II, 1984); see also 130 CONGo REG. HI 0,446 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (comments of 
Rep. Rose: "Today, we come a long way by making it clear that the manufacture, sale, 
and home use of earth stations are legal activities."); 130 CONGo REG. H 10,446 (daily ed. 
Oct. I, 1984) (comments of Rep. Tauzin: "the right to view satellite television program-
ming in one's home or other dwelling place"). 
244 130 CONGo REG. HIO,435 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 
245 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20. 
246 Cable Act § 601(6), 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (Supp. III 1985). 
247 [d. at § 601(2), 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
